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A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE PHYSICAL SPRING OF Human Actions, AND THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THINKING.

By Samuel Strutt.

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PAge 11. Line 1. for *extream*, read *extreme*, p. 22. *reference o*, for § 35. r. § 32. p. 28. l. 23. *dele* [*or*] p. 31. l. 8. for *Connection*, r. *Connexion*. p. 35. l. 2. for, *that the motion of a Body in ſuch a Direction*, r. [*a Body ſo in Motion.*]

A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE PHYSICAL SPRING OF HUMAN ACTIONS, &c.

§ 1. THE Notion which generally prevails at preſent is, that Man conſiſts of *Animal* and *Rational* Nature; the former of which is admitted to be only *Matter*, under that peculiar Organization, and therefore *mechanical*, and ſubject to all the Laws of *Mechaniſm*; but the latter it is inſiſted, is the Reſult of an *Immaterial* Subſtance, confin'd (*ſome how or other*) to the material Frame; ſubject

to none of the Laws of Matter; but is *unſolid*, *penetrable*, *indiſcerpible*, and *unchangeable*; and has a Power, free from all *Reſtraints* and *Impediments*, of *beginning*, *directing*, and *withholding*, the Motions of the Body.

§ II. This unphiloſophical Notion poſſibly could not be more effectually expos'd than by an Enquiry into its riſe and progreſs in the World; from whence it would eaſily be collected, that *Reaſon* had no part in its Inſtitution; tho' ſome Men of Learning, ſince it has been found ſo *uſeful* a Notion in the Support of certain Schemes, have with great *Dexterity*, endeavour'd to prove it very rational, and conſiſtent with the pureſt Philoſophy.

§ III. But as that would be an Undertaking intirely inconſiſtent with the deſign of this ſhort Enquiry; which is to conſider the Subject upon its *Philoſophical* and *Metaphyſical* Principles, the Reader therefore is referr'd to what has been already ſo ſucceſsfully offer'd on that Head, by the learned Mr. *Toland*. (*a*)

(*a*) *Toland*'s Letters to *Serena*.

§ IV.

§ IV. The firſt thing therefore, which will be neceſſary to be enquir'd into is, of what *Subſtance* the Intelligent Creature call'd Man conſiſts: 'till this be examin'd, it will be impoſſible to determine with any kind of Certainty concerning the Queſtion before us. And that this *Subſtance* is nothing but *Matter* under a *peculiar Modification*, it is apprehended will fully appear from the following Conſiderations.

1ſt, *That we have no Ideas of Subſtance, but thoſe which have been receiv'd by our Senſes from external Objects.*

2dly, *That the only Ideas which we have ſo receiv'd, are of Matter, or material Subſtance only.*

3dly, *That we have no Reaſon to conclude, that any part of the human Compoſition conſiſts of Immaterial Subſtance; becauſe we have no Ideas of any other Subſtance than Matter, and becauſe there is nothing (that we know of) in the Nature of Matter, which is incompatible, with Thinking, and* — (*b*)

(*b*) Sect. 28.

4thly, *That it appears moſt evidently from the Nature of Cogitation, that Matter is the Subject of it; or, to ſpeak in the Language of the modern Metaphyſicians, in which Cogitation Inheres.* (*c*)

§ V. It is unneceſſary to attempt a Proof of the *firſt* and *ſecond* Propoſitions; which indeed are *Self-evident*; and therefore don't admit of Proof; for that no *Appearance* in Nature, nor any thing about which our *Senſes* are converſant, ever convey'd to us the *Idea* of an *Immaterial* Subſtance, is out of diſpute; but if it ſhould remain a doubt with any, it will be perfectly clear'd up before this Subject is quitted.

§ VI. The *third* Propoſition can't be better illuſtrated, than by taking a ſhort View of the Controverſy, between the learned Dr. *Clark* and the *great* Mr. *Collins*, concerning the *Capacity* of Matter to think; *which ſeems to have ended in a Demonſtration by the latter*, that for ought appear'd to the contrary, Matter was *capable* of thinking; tho' it

(*c*) Sect. 31.

muſt

muſt be confeſs'd the Doctor wrote the laſt Letter. (*d*)

§ VII. The Point which was in Diſpute between them was at laſt reduc'd to this, Whether it was poſſible in any Inſtance, to predicate an *Individual Quality* or Attribute of a whole Syſtem, without predicating the ſame of every part in ſome degree: If it was, the Dr. admitted the Soul might be material.

§ VIII. That which reduc'd the Controverſy to this point was, the Doctor's inſiſting, that if Thought *reſided* or *inher'd* in a material Syſtem, it muſt in ſome degree, *reſide* or *inhere*, in every conſtituent part; or elſe there would be an Effect without a Cauſe, and ſomething in the whole which was more than all the Parts; and if Thought did *reſide* or *inhere*, in every conſtituent part in ſome degree, then the Act of *Thinking* or *Conſciouſneſs*, (which Terms the Doctor made uſe of indiſcriminately,) would not be one *individual ſimple* Act of Thinking or Conſciouſneſs, but would conſiſt of a *vaſt*

(*d*) Dr. *Clark*'s and Mr. *Collins*'s Letters concerning the materiality of the Soul.

Number of Conſciouſneſſes; as many as there were conſtituent parts in the Subject in which Conſciouſneſs *inher'd*; the contrary of which the Doctor obſerv'd we all experienc'd; and therefore concluded that *Matter* could not be the Subject of Cogitation.

§ IX. But Mr. *Collins* in anſwer to this pretended Objection; which in reality has no Foundation in reaſon, prov'd, that there was no neceſſity in all inſtances, for every conſtituent part of a Subject to partake of the *individual Quality* or Attribute which might be affirm'd of the whole; particularly in the Inſtance of the *Rotundity* of a Globe; for tho' *Rotundity* could be truly predicated of the whole, yet it could not of *any* of the conſtituent parts in *any* degree; which in themſelves, *ſeparately* and *diſtinctly* conſider'd were not rotund; altho' each part by its Situation had a Tendency to produce Rotundity in the whole; but actually poſſeſs'd no portion of it ſeparately conſider'd.

§ X. When this was ſettled, Mr. *Collins* purſu'd the Parallel of *Rotundity* and *Thinking* or *Conſciouſneſs*; which, tho' it did not *reſide* or *inhere* in every

every conſtituent part of the Subject of Cogitation in any Degree, yet each part by its *Situation* might have a *Tendency* to produce *Thinking* or *Conſciouſneſs* in the Whole, without actually poſſeſſing *any Portion* of Thinking *ſeparately* conſider'd, in the ſame manner that every part of the portion of Matter, which conſtituted the Globe, had a *Tendency* to produce Rotundity in the whole; which yet could not be predicated of *any* of the parts, *ſeparately* and *diſtinctly* conſider'd in *any* Degree.

§ XI. Twenty Pages were employ'd by the Doctor, to get rid of this Parallel; but at laſt he endeavour'd to prove it was no parallel, by inſiſting, that *Rotundity* was but an *extrinſical Denomination*, and not a real *inherent Quality* in the Subject; but only a mere Idea rais'd in us, by the Situation of an external Object; and did not really *inhere* or *reſide* in the Subject, as *Thinking* or *Conſciouſneſs* does. (*e*)

§ XII. The juſtneſs of this diſtinction, depends on the difference between what the Doctor calls an *outward*

(*e*) Sect. 27.

and

and *extrinſical Denomination*, and a *real inherent* Quality.

§ XIII. If therefore it ſhall appear, that all *Qualities* are equally *real*; or rather, that there is no *reality* in any Quality, the Sinews of the Doctor's Diſtinction are deſtroy'd.

§ XIV. But it will be proper before this is enter'd upon, to define a Quality or attribute; *By a Quality or Attribute is meant, whatever may be predicated of any Subject, reſulting from its Texture and Frame.*

§ XV. And becauſe the *Qualities* or *Attributes* of Subjects, have been often underſtood in ſo different a Senſe, from that which is here intended to be convey'd, it will be neceſſary to be very particular concerning this Doctrine of Qualities or Attributes; but more particularly in View to a Confutation of Dr. *Clarke*'s diſtinction, of *real inherent Qualities* in the Subject, and *outward* an *extrinſical* Denominations, as he calls them.

§ XVI. The judicious Mr. *Lock*, has indeed in a great meaſure well ex-

plain'd the nature of Qualities; yet it muſt be confeſs'd, he has thro' an *inaccuracy* and want of clear Diſtinctions, afforded much occaſion to puzzle and perplex the Underſtanding concerning Qualities; which in ſeveral places he talks of as *Real Beings*.

§ XVII. When he ſays (*f*) that the "*Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, Motion and Reſt of the ſolid parts of Bodies, are really in Bodies whether we perceive them or no*", what is this but affirming, that theſe primary Qualities, as he calls them, are *Real Beings?* for if they were not, it would be impoſſible they could be, IN the SUBJECT: Since it would be very unphiloſophical to ſay, that That which has no *real Being* is IN or OUT of a Subject; and nothing can have a *real Being* but a SUBSTANCE; unleſs a Medium can be found out between a *Subſtance* and the *Negation* of it; between *Something* and *Nothing*: This indeed would ſerve to explain what is meant by Qualities *being or inhering*, (as the Doctor has it) *in* a Subject.

(*f*) Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding, *Fo.* 4 *Edit. Book* 2. *cap.* 8. *ſect.* 17.

§ XVIII. The Truth is, that *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Number*, *Situation*, *Motion* and *Reſt*, which Mr. *Lock* calls primary Qualities, are no more *really* in the Subject of which thoſe Qualities may be predicated, than *Colours*, *Sounds* or *Smell* are in the Bodies that produce thoſe Ideas in us.

§ XIX. This may be as difficult a Truth to receive as any of thoſe which Mr. *Lock* introduc'd in the World, upon the Publication of his Book on human *Underſtanding*, ſo juſtly valu'd for the Uſe it has been of to Mankind, in rendering rational Enquiries after Truth, eaſy and plain to all Men of common Underſtanding; who before were thought unfit to be intruſted with the Means of reaſoning and judging for themſelves; But the moſt which is ask'd is a deliberate Attention, and then it is preſum'd this Difficulty will vaniſh.

§ XX. The Body of which we affirm ſuch a peculiar *Figure*, *Bulk*, *Situation*, *Motion*, or *Reſt* only ſo exiſts, or under ſuch a Modification, that we collect thoſe Ideas from it: It is true the Subject itſelf, if it has a terminated Exiſtence muſt

muſt have extream parts; which conſtitute what we call Figure; and ſo it muſt likewiſe be of ſuch a Bulk, or in ſuch a peculiar Situation, and in *motion* or at *reſt*: But theſe Qualities are only the ſeveral *Manners*, under which the Body or the Object preſents itſelf to us, or in which we perceive it to exiſt; and to ſay the *Manner* of a Thing's Exiſtence, is IN, the Thing itſelf, would be very unphiloſophical; and yet when Mr. *Lock* ſays, that *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Number*, *Situation*, Motion or Reſt are *in* the Subject whether we perceive them or no, it is in effect, only ſaying this.

§ XXI. It will be allow'd, that the Subject would ſo exiſt, or in that manner, whether we perceiv'd it or no; but it no more follows from thence, that therefore theſe Qualities are *in the Subject*, than if it ſhould be ſaid a Body is *hard* or *ſoft*, and therefore a Concluſion ſhould be drawn that, *Hardneſs* or *Softneſs* are *in the Subject* of which thoſe Qualities are predicated; which yet are nothing more, than that peculiar Texture or Modification of the Subject, in virtue of which we affirm it is *hard* or *ſoft*; ſo with regard to thoſe

other Qualities of *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Number*, *Situation*, *Motion*, *and Reſt*; which are nothing more than that *peculiar Texture* and *Situation of the Subject*, in virtue of which we affirm it is of ſuch a Bulk, ſuch a Figure, is ſo particularly ſituated, or that it moves, or is at Reſt.

§ XXII. And tho' *Hardneſs* or *Softneſs*, are what Mr. *Lock* calls *ſecondary* Qualities, yet when we conſider his reaſon for diſtinguiſhing between *primary* and *ſecondary* Qualities, which is, that the Exiſtence of the latter ſolely depends upon us, (*i. e.*) the Operation of Bodies external to us upon our Senſes, but that the Former are *really in the Bodies themſelves*, whether we perceive them or no, it will appear that this is a diſtinction without a difference; for tho' the Idea of *Hardneſs* or *Softneſs*, which is rais'd in us by the Application of ſomething external, is not *in the Subject*, yet the Subject that produces that Idea in us, would have exiſted under that *particular Texture* or *Modification*, which enabled us to receive the Idea, in virtue of which we affirm it is *hard* or *ſoft*; whether we perceived it or no; and conſequently

quently what Mr. *Lock* calls *ſecondary* Qualities, are as much really *in the Subject* as *primary* Qualities; and what is ſaid of *hardneſs* and *ſoftneſs*, is equally true of all other *ſecondary* Qualities as they are call'd.

§ XXIII. What more do we mean when we ſay, that thoſe which Mr. *Lock* calls primary Qualities, are *in Bodies* whether we perceive them or no, than that Bodies exiſt in ſuch a manner, that we can affirm thoſe particular Qualities of them? or in other words, that the Body, not the Qualities of it, *preſents itſelf to us under thoſe ſeveral Appearances*; which are not, (ſtrictly and philoſophically ſpeaking) *in the Body* itſelf; but are only the Terms we make uſe of, in order to be intelligible to each other; which are no more than to expreſs merely the *manner*, in which we perceive Bodies as to their Modes of Exiſtence.

§ XXIV. Tho' Mr. *Lock* has gone ſo far as to mention (*g*) the different *modifications* of Qualities; and perhaps the Abſurdity of this whole Doctrine

(*g*) Eſſay *cap.* 8. Section 23.

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concerning the *reality* of Qualities, can't be better explain'd, than by a ſhort Obſervation upon this Notion of Mr. *Lock*'s about the *Modification* of them; for if there is a Poſſibility to *modify* a Quality, then it muſt be acknowledg'd the whole of what has been ſaid on this head is idle and fruitleſs; becauſe in that Caſe, a Quality muſt neceſſarily be a *Subſtance*.

§ XXV. This Experiment can't be better try'd, than upon thoſe Qualities which Mr. *Lock* calls original and primary; and to which he attributes great Reality, *viz.* *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Number*, *Situation*, *Motion*, and *Reſt*.

§ XXVI. That a Body of ſuch a *Bulk*, *Figure*, or ſo particularly ſituated, or that is in *motion* or at *reſt* may be differently *modify'd*, that is, that the Subject of which we predicate thoſe Qualities, may be differently modify'd, and exiſt in a different manner, is diſputed by none; But to affirm that the *Motion* or the *Reſt* of a Body, or its *Figure*, *Bulk*, or *Situation* (which are only the ſeveral manners in which we perceive the Body, as to its Mode of Exiſtence,) can be differently *modify'd*, is talking unintelligibly: The thing

thing itſelf, exiſting in that *manner*, may be differently modify'd, but the *Manner* cannot be differently *modify'd*; for that would be conſidering it as a *Subſtance*; an Abſurdity before taken notice of.

§ XXVII. This being ſettled, it may be applied to the Doctor's Diſtinction, between an *outward* and *extrinſical* Denomination, and a *real inherent* Quality in the Subject; which the Doctor affirms is the Difference, between Rotundity and Thinking or Conſciouſneſs; (*b*) ſince if the foregoing Obſervations are true, it appears that the Diſtinction between a *real* and inherent Quality, and an outward and *extrinſical* Denomination, is without any foundation; and that (ſtrictly and philoſophically ſpeaking) no Quality inheres *in the Subject*; and conſequently the Parallel, (which if true would take away the Diſtinction) is a juſt parallel.

§ XXVIII. So much then of the force of the Doctor's Argument, which depends upon this being an unjuſt Parallel is abated; and when the whole of this

(*b*) Sect. 11.

Con-

Controverſy, is conſider'd by an attentive Reader, he will find the Doctor has left us at full Liberty to conclude, in the Words of the third Propoſition, "*that* "*for ought appears to the contrary* (from his Arguments or any other Conſideration,) "*Matter may be capable of think-* "*ing; ſince Nothing appears in the* "*Nature of Matter to be incompatible* "*with Thinking*"; (*i*) which will be fully prov'd under the fourth head, and carry'd beyond Controverſy in the Courſe of this Enquiry.

§ XXIX. But before the Proof of the fourth Propoſition is enter'd upon, it will be neceſſary to repeat what is meant by an *Immaterial Subſtance*, and by a *Material Subſtance*.

§ XXX. An *Immaterial Subſtance*, is ſaid to be an *indiſcerpible*, *unſolid*, *unchangeable*, *penetrable*, and *unextended* Subſtance; (*k*) but becauſe Dr. *Clark* has ſuppos'd, that *Extenſion* may be an Attribute of what is call'd an immaterial Subſtance, (tho' with what Propriety, is not neceſſary here to be

(*i*) Sect. 4.
(*k*) Sect. 5.

conſider'd) the Ideas of an Immaterial Subſtance, may be confin'd to *unſolid*, *penetrable*, *indiſcerpible* and *unchangeable* only.

Material Subſtance, is allow'd by all to be the Reverſe of this; to be *diſcerpible*, *ſolid*, *impenetrable*, *extended*, and liable to conſtant Variation and Change.

§ XXXI. This difference between our Ideas of what is call'd an *Immaterial* Subſtance, and a *Material* Subſtance, being thus eſtabliſh'd, the fourth Propoſition which is, *that it appears from the Nature of Cogitation, that Matter is the Subject of it*, may with more eaſe be demonſtrated.

§ XXXII. It will certainly be allow'd, that we think very *unlike*, (and have different Ideas) at different times; and that the Mind is almoſt conſtantly gaining new Ideas, and ceaſing to retain ſeveral others which before might have been predicated of it. (*l*)

§ XXXIII. If therefore it ſhall appear, that this *Change*, or *Succeſſion* of Ideas, is abſolutely *incompatible* with the *In-*

(*l*) Sect. 35.

 diſcerpibility,

diſcerpibility, *Inſolidity*, *Penetrability*, and *Unchangeableneſs* of the Subject of Cogitation, it will follow that That only, which is *diſcerpible*, *ſolid*, *penetrable*, and *changeable*, can be the Subject of Cogitation; and conſequently *material* (and not *immaterial*) Subſtance is the Subject of Cogitation; which may be demonſtrated by the following Propoſitions.

1ſt, *Every Quality or Attribute, that can be affirm'd of any Subject, muſt neceſſarily be the Reſult of the Texture and Frame of the Subject, of which it may be predicated.* (*m*)

2dly,

(*m*) The firſt Propoſition ſerves as well to eſtabliſh the preſent Hypotheſis, as it does to anſwer what Mr. *Lock* has ſaid in his Eſſay, *Book* 4. *Cap.* 3. *Sect.* 6. concerning God's *ſuperadding* a Quality to Matter, which might render it capable of thinking; for if every Quality or Attribute muſt neceſſarily be the Reſult of the Texture and Frame of its Subject, then it will be impoſſible to ſuperadd any Quality, unleſs ſomething that is material be added to the Subject; in which caſe no new Quality would be ſuperadded, but that Portion of Matter would really be converted into ſomething elſe, that would be ſpecifically different from all other Matter: It being as inconceivable that any Quality ſhould be actually ſeparated from its Subject, (*which the Superaddition of*

2dly, *While the Subject continues exactly in the ſame Texture and Frame, it can neither acquire any new Qualities or Attributes, nor ceaſe to retain any that might be before predicated of it; nor will there be a Poſſibility, of affirming more or leſs Qualities or Attributes of the Subject, while the Texture and Frame of it, upon which its Qualities ultimately depend, remain invariable.*

3dly, *That every new Idea which may be predicated of the Mind, or ſubject of Cogitation, being a new Quality or Attribute acquir'd, and every Idea which it forgets or ceaſes to retain, being the Loſs of a Quality or Attribute, or in other Words, of what could before have been affirm'd of the Mind, it follows, if the ſecond Propoſition be true, that this can only ariſe from, and be occaſion'd by ſome real Change or Alteration, in the*

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of a Quality ſuppoſes) as to conceive the Figure of a Body, actually ſeparated from the Body itſelf.

That God might ſo modifie and diſpoſe the Parts of any Syſtem of Matter, as to make it capable of Thinking, might very reaſonably have been ſaid by one, who doubted of the natural Capacity of Matter to think, but that a Quality muſt be ſuperadded for that Purpoſe, is both impoſſible and unintelligible.

Frame and Texture of the Subject of Cogitation.

§ XXXIV. Theſe three Propoſitions, on the Truth of which depends the fourth Propoſition, by which it was to be ſhewn, *from the Nature of Cogitation that Matter is the Subject of it*, may be prov'd in the following conciſe manner.

1ſt, *If the Qualities or Attributes of Subjects, did not reſult from the Frame and Texture of thoſe Subjects, of which they may be predicated, then a Quality or an Attribute might exiſt ſeparately and independently of its Subject; which is the Abſurdity before taken notice of, and conſequently the firſt Propoſition muſt be true.*

2dly, *If the ſecond Propoſition was not true, the Subject would continue in the ſame Texture and Frame, and not in the ſame Texture and Frame at the ſame time, which is a Contradiction; for every Quality or Attribute that can be predicated of any Subject, being the Reſult of the Texture and Frame of it, it neceſſarily Follows, that while the Subject continues under that Identical Texture and Frame, its Qualities or Attributes muſt remain invariable; nor (in the*

the words of the ſecond Propoſition) *will there be a poſſibility, of affirming more or leſs Qualities or Attributes of the Subject, while the Texture and Frame of it, upon which its Qualities ultimately depend, remain the ſame; ſince if that were poſſible, then the Qualities or Attributes of Subſtances do not reſult from the Texture and Frame of thoſe Subjects of which they may be predicated; which is already prov'd to be an Abſurdity.*

3dly, *The third Propoſition muſt be true if the ſecond is, by a neceſſary Conſequence; for if every new Idea is a new Quality or Attribute acquir'd, and every Idea, which the Mind forgets or ceaſes to retain, is the Loſs of a Quality or Attribute; or in other Words of what could before have been affirm'd of the Mind, which is a Self-evident Truth and diſputed by none; Then it will follow from the ſecond Propoſition, that this can only ariſe from, and be occaſion'd by ſome real Change or Alteration, in the Frame and Texture of the Subject of* (*n*) *Cogitation.*

§ XXXV. Theſe three Propoſitions being conſider'd as true, as alſo that our

(*n*) Sect. 46.

Ideas

Ideas continually ſucceed each other, (*o*) it follows unavoidably, that the Subject of Cogitation, is in conſtant *Change* and *Alteration* in its *Texture* and *Frame*, and conſequently is *diſcerpible* and *changeable*: And as the Attributes of *inſolidity* and *penetrability* are inſeparable from the *Indiſcerpibility* of any Subject, it neceſſarily follows that the Subject of Cogitation, being *diſcerpible* and *changeable*, it muſt alſo be *ſolid* and *impenetrable*; and conſequently *Matter*, is the Subject of Cogitation.

§ XXXVI. Tho' this Conſequence might as eaſily be deduced ſingly, from the *Diſcerpibility* of the Subject of Cogitation; becauſe *Indiſcerpibility*, by Doctor *Clark* (*p*) in his Diſpute with Mr. *Collins*, and by almoſt all the defenders of the *Immateriality* of the Soul, is made the *diſtinguiſh'd* and *principal Characteriſtic of an Immaterial Subſtance*.

(*o*) Sect. 35.

(*p*) Dr. *Clark*'s and Mr. *Collins*'s Letters refer'd to. Sect. 6.

§ XXXVII.

§ XXXVII. Theſe Conſequences, are not only to be deduc'd from a ſtrictly argumentative Enquiry, but from the conſtant *Variation* of *Thought* and Succeſſion of Ideas, agreeing ſo exactly with the Nature of Matter; which ſeems to be always in Motion, and ſhifting and varying its Modification; nor in reality, can the *Variety*, and *Fluctuation* of Thought be accounted for rationally, upon any other Principles, than that of the continual *Change* in the *Texture* and *Frame* of the Subject of Cogitation; ſince it is inconceivable and impoſſible, that there could be any *Change* in the *Qualities* or *Attributes* of a Subject; or that more or leſs could be affirm'd of it at different points of time, and yet the *Texture* and *Frame* of the Subject remain invariably and ſpecifically the ſame. When once a Propoſition ſo abſurd as this, can be thought true by any Man who pretends to make uſe of his Underſtanding; or to reaſon concerning Matters of Speculation, the Profeſſors of Tranſubſtantiation, need not deſpair of being thought the Meſſengers of Truth and Reaſon.

§ XXXVIII.

§ XXXVIII. The Way being thus pav'd, the *Enquiry into the Spring of Human Actions, and the immediate Cauſe of the various Modes of Thinking*, may be enter'd into with much more Perſpicuity, than it would have been poſſible to preſerve in a point of ſo nice Speculation, as that which is at preſent in view.

§ XXXIX. The *Spring of Human Actions*, has generally been underſtood, prticularly by Mr. *Lock*, and ſeveral other Writers of equal Eſteem, to be in the *Underſtanding*; and ultimately to depend upon *Thought*, and *Volition*; but the late learned Dr. *Clarke*, (who differs with moſt modern Writers in the manner of defending Human Liberty,) lays it down expreſly, that the (*q*) *Spring of Action is not in the Underſtanding*; of which moſt extraordinary Poſition, particular notice will be taken hereafter. But here it will be proper to conſider, the force of what Mr. *Lock* ſays in ſupport of his Opinion; which will render the Enquiry in view

(*q*) Dr. *Clarke*'s Letters to the Gent. at *Cambridge*, concerning Liberty and Neceſſity.

more intelligible; and ſerve to explain ſeveral Points that will be inſiſted on in this Purſuit.

§ XI. Mr. *Lock* in his endeavour to confute the Oppoſers of Creation, attempts to prove that *Thought* and *Volition* can move Body; His Words are theſe (*r*) "We can't conceive how "any thing but *Impulſe* of *Body* can "*move Body*, and yet that is not a ſuf-"ficient Reaſon to make us deny it "poſſible, againſt the conſtant Expe-"rience we have of it in our ſelves, in "all our voluntary Motions; which "are produc'd in us only by the *Free* "*Action or Thought* of our own *Minds*; "and are not, nor can be the effects of "the *Impulſe* or *Determination* of the "motion of blind Matter in or upon "our Bodies; for then it could not be "in our power or choice to alter it: "For Example, my right hand writes "whilſt my left hand is ſtill, what "cauſes *Motion* in one and *Reſt* in "the other? Nothing but my *Will*, a "*Thought of my Mind*; My *Thought*

(*r*) Eſſay, *Book.* 4. *Cap.* 10. *Sect.* 19.

" only changing, the right hand *rests*
" and the left hand *moves*: This is
" matter of Fact which can't be de-
" ny'd; explain this and make it intel-
" ligible, and the next Step will be to
" underſtand Creation".

§ XLI. Upon this occaſion, it will be neceſſary to take the Liberty of comparing, what Mr. *Lock* ſays in his Chapter of Power concerning *Volition*, with what he advances in the Quotation above; that the Reader may be able to judge, how conſiſtently Mr. *Lock* has wrote upon this Subject.

§ XLII. In the ſame Eſſay He ſays, " (*s*) That the *Will*, is Nothing but
" one *Power* or *Ability*, and *Freedom*
" another *Power* or *Ability*, ſo that
" to ask, whether the *Will* has *Free-*
" *dom*, is to ask whether one *Power*
" has another *Power*, one *Ability* an-
" other *Ability*; a Queſtion at firſt ſight
" too groſly abſurd to need an Anſwer;
" For who is he that ſees not that
" *Powers* belong only to *Agents*, and

(*s*) *Ib. Cap.* of Power. *Sect.* 16.

" are

" are Attributes of *Subſtances* not of " *Powers* themſelves; ſo that this way " of putting the Queſtion, whether the " *Will* be *free*, is in effect to ask whe- " ther the *Will* be a *Subſtance*, or an " *Agent*".

§ XLIII. When this is compar'd, with what is quoted out of Mr. *Lock*'s tenth Chapter, it will appear, that he has conſider'd the Will in one place, as the Agent or Subject itſelf, and in the other, as a mere *power* or *predicable* of the Agent or Subject; and has attributed ſo much *power* to *Volition* in the firſt inſtance, as to make it the very *Cauſe* of Motion and Reſt in Body; but in the latter, has reduc'd it to a mere *Power* or *Predicable* only, incapabale of any *Action* or *Cauſality*.

§ XLIV. It may a little ſurprize the Reader poſſibly, to find ſo flagrant a Contradiction in ſo admir'd an Author as Mr. *Lock*; but this will be left to be explain'd by the intelligent Reader; who need not be inform'd of the Prejudices and Difficulties this *Great Man* had to encounter, when he wrote this uſeful and elaborate Treatiſe; tho' it is

not very unlikely that his Miſtake, in making *Volition* or *Thought* the *Cauſe* of the alternate *Motion* and *Reſt* of the left and right Hand, may have crept in from the conſideration of the Action's being the Conſequence, or immediately following the Reſolution to move either of the Hands; which is ſo very unhappy, that it is miſtaking the *Effect* for the *Cauſe*: For *Thought* or *Volition*, being only mere *Powers* or *Abilities*, can have no *power* to cauſe either *Motion* or *Reſt* in Bodies; ſince that would be to affirm (in the Words of Mr. *Lock*) that, "one *Power* or *Ability* has an-"other *Power* or *Ability*; an Affirma-"tion too groſly abſurd to need an An-"ſwer; for who is it that ſees not that "*Powers*, belong only to *Agents*, and "are Attributes of *Subſtances*, and not "*Powers* themſelves".

§ XLV. *Thinking*, *Willing*, or *Reſolving*, can no more *act* upon a Body, or give it a new Determination, than *Length*, *Breadth*, or *Thickneſs*, or *Rotundity* can, for that ſolely depends on PHYSICS. In the Motion of the hand in the inſtance Mr. *Lock* gives, there is a *phyſical* Effect produced; which muſt neceſſarily have

have had a *physical* Cauſe, (as will be prov'd immediately): And *Thought* or *Volition*, is ſo far from being the *phyſical* Cauſe of this Motion, that it was only the mere *Effect* of that new *Modification or Change* in the Texture of the Subject, by which that Reſolution was neceſſarily form'd to move the right or left hand; the *actual* and *real Cauſe*, both of the *Reſolution* and the *Action* that follow'd, was *phyſical* and *mechanical*, and conſequently neceſſary.

XLVI. *Thought*, is ſo incapable of being the *efficient* Cauſe of *phyſical Action* or Motion of a Body, that it can't even produce Thought; When we ſay one Idea *produces* another, or one *Thought introduces* another, it is not meant that *Thinking* really *produces* other Thoughts; which can no other way be effected, but in virtue of ſome *Variation* or *Change*, in the *Frame* and *Texture* of the Subject of Cogitation; (*t*) becauſe, without ſuch an alteration, it is abſolutely impoſſible there could be any *Succeſſion* of Ideas; but the Mind

(*t*) *Vide* the Proof of the third Propoſition. *Sect.* 34.

muſt

muſt in that caſe, *always and invariably think alike; and have one and the ſame ſet of Ideas.* And that *Thinking*, can't be the *Efficient* Cauſe of this *Change* in the Subject, is already prov'd to Demonſtration; It being a mere *predicable or attribute* of the Subject, and can therefore no more *influence* or be the *Cauſe* of *Action* or *Motion* in a Body, than the particular *colour* of a Bowl, can be the *Cauſe* of its Motion.

§ XLVII. Tho' it may be obſerv'd of this Poſition of Mr. *Lock*'s, (by which he endeavours to prove, that *Thought* or *Volition*, can be the Cauſe of the *Motion* and *Reſt* of Bodies,) that it is not ſo ſingular as it ſeems abſurd: There are many others, whoſe Characters in the World for Reaſoning and Literature are too well known, to make it neceſſary to mention them, who have very ſtrenuouſly contended for what in effect is the ſame thing; tho' for a different purpoſe than Mr. *Lock* ſeems to have introduc'd it in that part of his Eſſay; Which is, that every Action neceſſarily follows the *laſt Judgment* of the Underſtanding; and therefore the *laſt Judgment* by theſe Gentlemen, muſt

be ſuppos'd the *Spring* of Action; which is to run into the Abſurdity of predicating one Property of another. But the Difficulty which attends this State of the Queſtion will appear moſt manifeſtly, when it is conſider'd, that there is no certain Medium, by which the abſolute phyſical Connection, between ſeeing the Reaſon of an Action and doing it can be prov'd; on the contrary Experience, would rather furniſh us with Arguments againſt this; which ſeems to prove, that the exertion of the Self-motive Power, as it is pleaſantly call'd by Dr. *Clark*, does not neceſſarily follow a Man's laſt Judgment, or what upon the whole he thinks beſt.

§ XLVIII. But ſuppoſing it were really true, that the Action always follow'd the laſt Judgment; it is putting a philoſophical Enquiry into the *Spring of human Actions* upon ſo uncertain a foot, that nothing but vain wrangling can be conſequence; for the Iſſue of the Diſpute depending upon what each man experiences, concering a Point they are divided about, it is hardly to be expected they ſhould ever agree: And if Experience, or what Men ſay they experience

perience, is to determine the Queſtion, almoſt every Man in the World would bear Teſtimony for Liberty; which ſeems to be the Reaſon why *Euphranor*, one of the Dialogiſts, in a late Syſtem of *little* Philoſophy, (*u*) reſts the whole Diſpute which was between him and *Alciphron* his Competitor, (who puſh'd him hard on the Subject of Neceſſity,) upon the ſingle Iſſue of every Man's Experience; without making uſe of one ſingle Argument, in anſwer *to three or four which were put very ſtrong* in that way of reaſoning; ſo that Philoſophy, can't be admitted to bear any part in a Controverſy of ſo whimſical a Nature.

§ XLIX. And that we may have a clearer view of the *Spring of human Actions*; and remove all kind of miſapprehenſion or Doubt, concerning the certainty of the ſeveral Concluſions that will be drawn from this Enquiry, it will be neceſſary curſorily, to conſider the general Laws of Matter.

(*u*) *Alciphron* or the Minute Philoſopher. Vol. 2. Fol.

§ L. All the *Actions* or *Motions* of Bodies, muſt neceſſarily depend on the two following Principles.

1ſt, *Upon the Phyſical and Mechanical Laws and Powers of the Bodies themſelves that are in Motion*; or,
2dly, *Upon the Impulſe or Contact, of ſome other Bodies.*

Theſe are the two only *conceivable Principles* upon which *Motion* can be accounted for: Two other *Principles* of *Motion* have indeed been talk'd of; which are,

3dly, *That Body, is capable of being put into Motion, or receiving a new Direction, by Thought, Intelligence,* or *Volition.* (*w*)
4thly, *That there is in the human Compoſition, a Self-motive, or Self-determining Power, which is ſaid to be the Spring of human Actions; and to conſtitute what is call'd Freedom.* (*x*)

(*w*) Eſſay, *Book* 4. *Cap.* 10. *Sect.* 19.
(*x*) Doctor *Clark*'s Letters refer'd to, *Sect.* 39.

§ LI. Upon a due Conſideration of the two firſt Propoſitions, will greatly depend the Truth of the Concluſions which will be drawn from this Enquiry; and therefore it will be neceſſary to conſider each head diſtinctly; which will clearly evince the *Impoſſibility*, of any Action's being the *Effect*, of either of the *Cauſes* aſſign'd under the two laſt heads.

§ LII. Firſt, *By Bodies which are in a particular Direction, reſulting from the phyſical Laws and Powers of the Bodies themſelves, is meant that Species of Motion, which may be ſuppos'd eſſential to Matter; and was not communicated from any Impulſe or Cauſe without, or that was foreign to it; but was as much the neceſſary Reſult of the Conſtitution and Frame of the Bodies ſo in Motion, as any other Quality or Attribute that could be predicated of them; and in this Senſe, ſuppoſing Motion to be eſſential to all or any given Quantity of Matter, (which is not neceſſary to be conſider'd under any diſtinct head, becauſe the Reader will eaſily collect from this Enquiry, ſufficient to conclude rightly concerning*

cerning that Queſtion,) it will hardly be contended, that the Motion of a Body in ſuch a Direction, does not depend on the Phyſical *and* Mechanical *powers of the Body it ſelf; which is all that is meant by the firſt Propoſition.*

§ LIII. Secondly, *To prove the ſecond Propoſition, it will be neceſſary to repeat one ſhort Poſtulatum; which is allow'd on all Hands.*

§ LIV. *That no Body which is at perfect Reſt, (ſuppoſing that to be poſſible) can put itſelf into Motion, or give itſelf a new Direction when in Motion, without undergoing ſome Phyſical Change, or being acted upon phyſically by ſomething external to it.*

§ LV. This is handed down to us under the Sanction of ſo great a Name, that it is almoſt exempt from the teſt of Examination: But no refuge will be taken even in Sir *Iſaac Newton* in this Enquiry; which pretends to pay no deference to Authority; and therefore it will be neceſſary to offer the following Reaſon in Support of it.

§ LVI. If a Body which is at *abſolute Reſt*, could put itſelf into Motion, or give itſelf a new Direction when in Motion, without undergoing any phyſical Change, or being acted upon phyſically by any thing external to it, "*then* "*more or leſs Attributes, could be af-* "*firm'd of the ſame Body at different* "*Points of time, and yet the Frame* "*and Texture of the Body itſelf con-* "*tinue exactly the ſame*"; which is already prov'd an Impoſſibility (*y*): And may be further prov'd ſo; becauſe in ſuch a ſuppoſition this manifeſt Abſurdity is involv'd, that a Body may be continu'd at *Reſt*, be put into *Motion*, or receive a new *Direction* when in *Motion*, from one and the *ſame Cauſe*; that is, under the *Sameneſs* and *Identity* of the Subject, in its *Texture* and *Frame*; to affirm which, is the ſame in effect as to affirm, that it may be at *Reſt*, in *Motion*, and in a *new Direction*, all at one and the ſame time; which is juſt as conceivable, as that it ſhould be in all three at different points

(*y*) *Vide* the Proof of the Second Propoſition. *Sect.* 34.

of

of Time, from one and the ſame Cauſe.

§ LVII. It remains therefore to be prov'd, that no Body which is at *reſt*, (ſuppoſing that to be poſſible) can be mov'd or acted upon, ſo as to be put into Motion, by any thing but the *Phyſical Impulſe or Contact* of ſome other Body; which is prov'd thus.

That only which has the power of Impulſe and Contact, can act upon or affect Body, ſo as to put it into Motion.

But whatever has the power of Impulſe and Contact, muſt be ſolid, and therefore Material.

And conſequently, Matter only can act upon or affect Body, ſo as to put it into Motion.

§ LVIII. This Argument appears ſo evident, that it ſhould ſeem unneceſſary to attempt a Proof of either of its Parts; eſpecially after what has been already obſerv'd upon this head in Anſwer to Mr. *Lock*, who aſſign'd another Cauſe for the Motion of Body, than the

the *Impulſe and Contact* of Body, (z) (tho' with what Propriety the Reader it is preſum'd has already determin'd:) But becauſe nothing ſhort of Demonſtration, will be admitted as an Evidence of the truth of any Poſition, which is endeavour'd to be ſupported in this Enquiry, all the parts of this Argument may be prov'd in the following Manner.

§ LIX. The firſt of which, (*viz.*) *that only which has the power of Impulſe and Contact, can act upon or affect Body, ſo as to put it into Motion*, may be prov'd thus.

That which has undergone no change or alteration in its Texture and Frame, no new Quality or Attribute can be affirm'd of it.

This has been already demonſtrated. (a)

And that Body which has not been acted upon by Impulſe and Contact, muſt ſtill continue in the ſame Texture and Frame.

(z) (40.) (a) *Vide* the Proof of the Second Propoſition. *Sect.* 34.

And

And conſequently, if it was at reſt before, it muſt be in the ſame Situation ſtill; becauſe Motion, would be a new Quality or Attribute acquir'd; which is already prov'd to be impoſſible, in a Subject that has undergone no Phyſical Change.

§ LX. In order to prove the ſecond Part of this Argument, which is, "*that* "*whatever has the power of Impulſe and* "*Contact, muſt be Solid and therefore* "*Material*"; it will be neceſſary to make the following ſhort Quotations, out of Mr. *Lock*, who ſays (*b*) "The Idea "of *Solidity*, we receive by our *Touch*, "[or Contact] and it ariſes, from "the *Reſiſtance* which we find in "Body, to the entrance of any other "Body into the place it poſſeſſes, till "it has left it": And in the ſame Chapter (*c*) He ſays, "upon the *Soli-* "*dity of Bodies* alſo depends, their "*Mutual Impulſe*, *Reſiſtance*, and *Pro-* "*truſion*".

(*b*) Eſſay, *Cap.* 4. *Sect.* 1.
(*c*) *Ib. Sect.* 5.

The

The whole of which is Self-evident; and from whence may be deduc'd the following Argument.

That of which the power of Reſiſtance can be predicated, muſt be ſolid *and* impenetrable.

But that which has the power of Impulſe and Contact, the power of Reſiſtance can be predicated of,

And conſequently, that which has the power of Impulſe and Contact muſt be ſolid *and* impenetrable.

And by the Definition of an Immaterial Subſtance, Solidity is excluded; conſequently, that which has the power of Impulſe and Contact muſt be Material: And thus the Truth of the ſecond Propoſition is demonſtrated.

§ LXI. Tho' this Argument might be lengthned and divided, and carry'd into Demonſtration in many Shapes; but the *Self-evident* Principles upon which it is founded, make it unneceſſary to tire the Reader, with Diviſions and Subdiviſions in the Support of what every unprejudiced Enquirer, will ſee

at firſt View; and confeſs to be founded upon Reaſon, and the *Teſtimony of his Senſes*; which latter is generally too much neglected in controverſies of this Kind; and chimerical abſtracted Ideas, which ſtand refer'd to no *Archetypes* in Nature ſubſtituted in its Stead.

§ LXII. The firſt and ſecond Propoſitions therefore being conſidered as true, it follows by neceſſary Conſequence, that it is impoſſible any Body ſhould be *put into Motion*, by either of the ſuppos'd Cauſes aſſign'd under the *Third* and *Fourth* Propoſitions; which may be further illuſtrated by a ſhort Obſervation, on a Quotation from the late learned Dr. *Cudworth*'s Intellectual Syſtem; where he is endeavouring to anſwer a particular Query.

§ LXIII. The Queſtion being concerning God's Power of putting the material World into Motion, the laſt Query, which the Doctor puts into the Mouth of his Objector, (*d*) was, " what Tools or In-

(*d*) *Cudworth*'s Intellectual Syſtem, *page* 886.

" ſtruments? what Machines or En-
" gines had the *Deity?* or how could
" He move the Matter of the Whole,
" eſpecially if incorporeal? becauſe he
" would run thro' all things, and could
" not lay hold or faſten upon any.
To which the Doctor anſwers, (*e*)
" That all other things being deriv'd
" from God as their only Fountain
" and Original, and eſſentially depen-
" ding on him, who by his abſolute
" Power could alſo annihilate what
" He created, he muſt needs have a
" deſpotic Power over all, and every
" thing whatſoever be naturally ſub-
" ject and obſequious to him; *And*
" *ſince no Body can poſſibly move it-*
" *ſelf*, that which firſt mov'd Matter
" muſt of Neceſſity be *incorporeal*;
" nor could it move it by *local* Motion
" as one Body moves another, or as
" Engines or Machines move by *Tru-*
" *ſion* or *Pulſion*, they being before
" mov'd; but muſt do it by another
" kind of Action ſuch as is not *local*
" Motion; nor *Heteroſineſie* but *Au-*
" *toſineſie*, that is by *Cogitation*; where-

(*e*) *Ib. page* 887.

" fore

" fore that conceit of the Atheiſts, " that Incorporeal Deity could not " poſſibly move the Matter of the " World, becauſe He would run thro' " it, and could not faſten or lay hold " thereupon, is abſurd; becauſe this " moves Matter *not mechanically* but " *vitally*, and by *Cogitation* only; and " that a *Cogitative Being* as ſuch, has " a natural IMPERIUM, over " Matter and Power of moving it, " without any Engines or Machines is " unqueſtionably certain, even from " our own Souls; which *move* our " Bodies and command them every " Way *merely by Will or Thought.*

§ LXIV. The Deſign of introducing this Quotation, was not to diſpute the Juſtneſs of Dr. *Cudworth*'s Anſwer with reſpect to the power of the Deity; who without Diſpute is omnipotent; but only to ſhew from the myſterious manner in which the Doctor has anſwer'd a plain Objection, the difficulty which attends a metaphyſical Explication of the Attributes and Powers of the Deity; which are better underſtood from the Self-evident Principles of common Reaſon and common Senſe,

than by any abſtruſe metaphyſical Speculations, concerning the Nature of a Being ſo infinitely beyond our Reach.

§ LXV. But that the cogitative Being call'd the *Soul can move the Body, and command it every Way merely by Will, or Thought*, is already prov'd to be abſolutely impoſſible; (*f*) ſince *Thought* or *Intelligence*, are only mere Attributes or Qualities of a Subject; and are therefore no more capable of being the Cauſes of the phyſical Motions of a Body, than Nothing is capable of producing Something; that which has no *real* Being can no more act, than it can be acted upon; ſo that to affirm a cogitative being (as ſuch) hath a natural IMPERIUM, (which Word if defined has no Meaning,) over Matter and Power moving it, without any Engines or Machines, either means, Nothing in reality, or if underſtood in the Senſe which he would be thought to convey, is already prov'd to be a Contradiction.

(*f*) Sect. 46.

§ LXVI.

§ LXVI. It has been thought indeed, that Dr. *Cudworth* has put ſome of his Objections too ſtrong, to ſuppoſe him not intereſted in the Defence of them, inſtead of anſwering them clearly; and that he did not intend to ſerve the Cauſe of Religion by it; but this ſurely can only be Clamour, ſince by this moſt learned Book, almoſt *every Argument which could be imagin'd to have any Weight againſt the Being of a God*, is there laid open and expos'd to publick View; and if the Doctor has not detected the Whole, yet he has given an Opportunity to any Man of Parts and Learning, to ſhew the Fallacy and Weakneſs of the Reſt; which is the greateſt Service that can be done to the Cauſe of true Religion; which requires nothing to ſupport it, but *fair Argument and free Enquiry*.

§ LXVII. From the ſeveral foregoing Propoſitions concerning the *Powers* of Bodies, and the reaſoning in ſupport of them, may be eaſily collected, that the accounting for the *Spring* of Human Actions, either

Firſt,

Firſt, *By a Self-motive or Self-determining Power, or*

Secondly, *By any* IMPERIUM *(which is only a magical Word,) that Mind as ſuch has over Body, or*

Thirdly, *By Intelligence or Volition,*

is inconceivable and impoſſible; and as little to be reconcil'd with the Principles of Reaſoning, as that an *Effect* ſhould be produc'd without a *Cauſe*; which in Fact is the Amount, of all theſe Accounts of the *Spring of human Actions.*

§ LXVIII. The laſt thing which is neceſſary to be conſider'd is, whether the Cauſes or the Spring of Human Actions, are from *Within* or *Without*; and what will be the Conſequence, with regard to the Principles already laid down, and the ſeveral Inferences from them, concerning the Spring of Human Actions, ſuppoſing the former or the latter of theſe to be true; which will be the more neceſ-

ſary

ſary to be enquir'd into, as it will furniſh an Opportunity of making a ſhort Obſervation, on that moſt extraordinary Poſition of Dr. *Clark*'s; (who was always a Contender for Liberty,) *That the Spring of Action is not in the Underſtanding.*

§ LXIX. That it does not evidently appear, we are acted upon by any thing external to us in all Inſtances of our Actions muſt be admitted; tho' it will be impoſſible to determine that Queſtion with any great Certainty; for although in ſeveral of our Actions, there is no apparent Connection between them, and Bodies external to us, as to any Cauſality; yet in many Inſtances there is a moſt evident Communication; and where the *ſole Spring* of our Actions is from without.

§ LXX. That Subſtance ſo peculiarly modify'd as Gunpowder, by the Oppoſition it meets with, when it is diſſipated in the Air through the Medium of a Gun, occaſions ſo great an *Agitation* in the *circumambient Air*, as very often to cauſe a violent *mechanical Motion* in the human Body.

§ LXXI.

§ LXXI. In what particular manner this *Effect* is produc'd; or how the Air or other Subſtance *acts* upon the Body ſo as to cauſe theſe Motions, perhaps will be impoſſible to determine; but this leaves no room to doubt of the Reality of it; which would not be more certain, even if the particular Manner in which it is done could be diſcover'd; for we are ſure theſe *Effects* muſt be produc'd *Phyſically*, and *Mechanically*; ſince Nothing can be more evident, than that Bodies cannot *act* upon each other *unleſs they* TOUCH.

§ LXXII. And this is all that can be ſuppos'd to be meant by thoſe who aſſert, we are acted upon by the *Impulſe* of Things *Without*; or by Objects that are *external* to us; which is, that there may be ſo cloſe and immediate a Connection and Communication, between the circumambient Air that always encompaſſes the Body, and the Body itſelf, that the *Spring* of every Action, may be founded in the *mechanical* and *neceſſary* Operation of the former upon the latter; and that the human Body may be ſo particularly fram'd

and conſtituted, that the *Spring* of every Action ariſes from Bodies external to us.

LXXIII. It would be in vain to ſay by way of anſwer to this, that we don't in all inſtances, ſee any immediate Communication or Connexion, between external Objects and the human Body, and therefore conclude there is none; for we ſee Matter in a great Variety of Motions and Situations, particularly in the Inſtance of the Loadſtone and Steel, the Spring of which can't with exactneſs be accounted for, nor diſcover'd; and yet no Man in his Senſes ever thought of any other Cauſe, than the *neceſſary* and *mechanical* Action of Bodies on each other, by *Impulſe* and *Contact*; and though we cannot diſcern the *phyſical Spring* of theſe Actions or Motions, We are not ſo ſenſeleſs to ſay they have no *phyſical* or *mechanical* Cauſe, or that they are the Effect of *Freedom* or *Liberty*.

§ LXXIV. And, if the *Spring of Human Actions is not in the Underſtanding*, (which Dr. *Clark* aſſerts,) it muſt

neceſſarily ariſe, either from the Action of Bodies external, or from phyſical Cauſes, reſulting from the very Being and Conſtitution of Man; by which ſome conſtituent Parts of the Frame, *neceſſarily* and *phyſically* and according to the Laws of Mechaniſm, act upon and move the other Parts ſo as to produce the Effect; but whether the former or latter are moſt predominant Cauſes of Action, is not neceſſary to be conſider'd with much exactneſs; ſince in either of which Caſes, as the *Quality* or *Attribute* of *Thinking* or *Volition* cannot poſſibly have any part in *producing* the Effect, (*g*) and as a *Body at Reſt, cannot put itſelf into Motion, or give itſelf a new Direction without undergoing ſome phyſical Change*, (*h*) it follows the Action is equally unavoidable and neceſſary, whether the Cauſe be *ab intra* or *ab extra*: And therefore the *Root and Spring of Human Actions, muſt be phyſical; and founded in the neceſſary and mechanical Nature of Matter.*

(*g*) Sect. 46.
(*h*) Sect. 58.

LXXV. And as the Motions of the Body muſt neceſſarily depend on phyſical, mechanical, and therefore neceſſary Cauſes; ſo muſt *Thinking* itſelf; for every new Idea which may be predicated of the Mind, muſt be the Effect of ſome *phyſical Change in the Subject, of which, as has already been prov'd to Demonſtration, no new Attribute can be affirm'd, while the Subject remains in the ſame Texture and Frame* (*i*); which Change, cannot be the Effect of *Cogitation*; ſince *Cogitation* is only a mere *Predicable* or *Quality*, and therefore incapable of producing any Alteration, in the Texture and Frame of a *real Being*; and conſequently *each new Idea, that can be affirm'd of the Mind, muſt be the Effect of ſome phyſical Cauſe; which muſt vary the Texture and Frame of the Subject, before any new Idea could be affirm'd of it.*

LXXVI. What may ſeem moſt ſurprizing in this caſe, are the *various*

(*i*) *Vide* the Proof of the ſecond Propoſition, *Sect.* 34.

Motions and Directions of Thinking Subſtances; which ſeem to be under different Laws and Powers, from *Incogitative* Subſtances; whence it is generally concluded, that the latter are govern'd by *phyſical* and *mechanical* Laws, but not the Former; altho' the whole difference is no more, than the different Textures and Modifications of the Subjects.

§ LXXVII. The Subſtance which thinks has not received a *new Nature*, but is ſtill the ſame Subſtance it was before that Attribute could be affirm'd of it; The real Difference therefore between an *Intelligent* and *Unintelligent* Subſtance is only this: That as the *Texture* and *Modification* on which *Thinking* depends, differ from all other *Modifications*, (*or elſe indeed all Matter would think*,) ſo the *Motions* and *Directions* of a *Thinking Subſtance* are different from all others; but in no other Senſe, than the Motions and Directions of all Bodies in general *differ*, as they are *differently fram'd* and *conſtituted*.

§ LXXVIII. With this *Key*, that Variety of Motions and Directions in which the Body is at different points of time, ſo different from the Motions and Directions of all inanimate Bodies, may as eaſily be reconcil'd with the *Principles and Laws of Mechaniſm, as the Motion of the Needle may with the phyſical Influence of the Loadſtone; or any other phyſical Effect which is produc'd in Nature.*

F I N I S.